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Abstract

There is continued investment and attention being paid to programs of disengagement and deradicalisation
(D&D) for Islamist terrorists. Whilst there is some evidence of positive effects of different programs, it is
widely acknowledged that rehabilitative efforts with terrorists are in their infancy and that there is a great deal of
potential for learning, development and refinement. The present article examines rehabilitation programs for
Islamist militants in light of the literature on rehabilitative interventions for „ordinary‟ criminal offenders, which
have been in development now for more than fifty years. Principles of best practice as well as challenges in the
field of criminal corrections are outlined, and the extent to which these may be applicable in the context of
dealing with terrorists is discussed. Although the content of criminal and terrorist rehabilitation programs will
always differ, criminology can help to clarify issues, improve practice, and develop realistic expectations for
rehabilitation of Islamist terrorists.

Rehabilitation of Islamist terrorists

Whilst processes of radicalisation have long been the subject of investigation, there is a
steadily growing interest1 in examining the opposite end of the spectrum of terrorism- how
organisations and individuals come to abandon violence and „deradicalise.‟ The goal of such
research is to learn how we might facilitate the decline of terrorist movements. One strategy
that has been gaining ground and publicity in recent years involves the implementation of
rehabilitative programs of disengagement and deradicalisation (D&D) for individual Islamist
militants.2 In particular, following pioneering efforts in Egypt, Yemen, Saudi Arabia and
Singapore, rehabilitation-style interventions have been established in Malaysia, Tajikistan,
Uzbekistan, Iraq, Great Britain and the Netherlands, and are at various stages of planning and
implementation in Afghanistan Thailand, Pakistan, and elsewhere around the world.3
Given that one of the leading figures of al-Qaeda in Yemen, Said Ali Shari (featured
in claims of responsibility for the December 25th, 2009, attempted attack on Northwest
Airlines Flight 253 by Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab) is a former Guantanamo detainee who
went through a Saudi-run „art-therapy rehabilitation program‟4 there is a pressing need to
assess existing efforts at rehabilitation.
Rehabilitation programs for jihadists are diverse, they are at different stages of
development, and have released limited details of their operation. They nevertheless share the
underlying assumption that it is possible to engage radical individuals and to persuade them
to desist from involvement with terrorist organisations, and to relinquish existing
commitment to violence. Barrett and Bokhari note that “[w]hile all [D&D] programmes have
achieved progress, even despite growing experience it is still too early to say with any
certainty that any have been fully successful. There are no established criteria of success and
no standards that apply across cultures” [emphasis added]. 5
Given the relative infancy of the concepts of disengagement and deradicalisation
within the field of terrorism studies, combined with the evident eagerness of governments to
3
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implement such interventions and the need to identify areas of best practice, the current
article seeks to explore what can be learned from the more established practice of
rehabilitation with „ordinary‟ offenders. Although the relevance of theories of criminal
desistance to understanding terrorist disengagement has previously been explored,6 parallels
between respective rehabilitative interventions have not.
First I consider distinctions between disengagement and deradicalisation at the
individual and collective levels, with a view to placing individual processes of withdrawal
from terrorism in context. Then I provide an overview of existing D&D programs, identifying
common themes in practice as well as specific issues that require further attention. Following
on from this, I describe rehabilitation efforts with ordinary offenders, including guidelines for
best practice and organisational implementation. Finally, I consider the degree to which
criminological theory and practice are relevant to working with Islamist militants, and offer
tentative recommendations for the future development of rehabilitative programs for Islamist
terrorists.
Disengagement and Deradicalisation
Building upon earlier work by Horgan,7 recent discussions of the decline of terrorism
emphasise the importance of making analytical distinctions between interrelated behavioural
and psychological, and individual and collective processes.8 The distinction between the
behavioural and psychological refers to the fact that decisions to abandon violence may
sometimes be behavioural only, e.g. for practical or involuntary reasons. Such cases do not
necessarily include an ideological reappraisal of the use of violence or related extremist
beliefs.9 Conversely, a person or group may come to believe that violence is not the answer
but remain involved, at least temporarily, for other reasons such as a sense of loyalty or for
self-preservation.10
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Here the term „disengagement‟ will be used as by Bjørgo and Horgan11 to refer to the
behavioural process, (which may or may not include changes in ideological commitment),
while „deradicalisation‟ is used more specifically to refer to changes in belief, with a
particular emphasis on the rejection of violence. It is important to note, however, that the
relationship between behaviour and cognition is complex, and acting in a certain way can
often give rise to supportive beliefs, rather than it necessarily being the other way around.12
Intervention programs for Islamist extremists tend to place a general emphasis on trying to
alter beliefs –whether or not they are successful- but they vary widely in practice and the
„bottom line‟ or ultimate aim is to bring about behavioural change- i.e. cessation of terrorist
involvement and abandonment of violence. They can thus be thought of as „risk reduction
initiatives‟13 and will be referred to throughout this paper either as D&D programs or as
rehabilitation programs for Islamist terrorists.
Collective Disengagement
Numerous case-studies of different types of terrorist group have detailed the decline of
particular campaigns of violence and thereby contribute to the growing knowledge-base
about what factors are involved in collective disengagement.14 Based on an analysis of events
in Egypt and Algeria, Ashour15 distinguishes between three levels of „deradicalisation‟.
Ideological deradicalisation involves a reasoned and justified rejection of violence, in
accordance with the above definition. Behavioural deradicalisation involves the cessation of
violent action as per „disengagement.‟ Finally, organisational deradicalisation involves
collective acceptance and adherence to a strategy of disengagement within a particular
organisation or movement. Ashour builds upon this to identify three types of collective
„deradicalisation‟, which here will be termed disengagement: 1. Comprehensive
disengagement, involving all three levels, i.e. an ideological, behavioural, and successful
organisational rejection of violence, (e.g. the Egyptian Islamic Group) 2. Substantive
5
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disengagement, involving ideological and behavioural levels, but with organisational
disagreement and factionalising, (e.g. the Egyptian Islamic Jihad) and 3. Pragmatic
disengagement, involving behavioural and organisational disengagement, but lacking an
ideological component (e.g. the Algerian Islamic Salvation Army).
Collective disengagement can occur for a variety of reasons16 and is best understood
as a complex, contextually unique set of interactions between groups of terrorists,
governments, their respective sympathisers and supporters, and competing groups.17 At the
same time, internal organisational interactions are equally important.18 Among the factors
that can contribute to the decline of terrorist organisations and decisions to disengage are both
state repression and inducements, loss of public support, loss of leadership, unsatisfactory
social relations within the organisation, failure to attract new members, recognition of failure
to achieve goals, achievement of goals, and transitioning to alternative avenues of action
(most notably political inclusion).19
While it is possible to distinguish between these factors according to whether they are
voluntary/involuntary or external/internal to the organisation, it is also quite obvious that they
are all deeply interrelated and affect one another. Moreover, many variables can have
multiple, contradictory effects regarding likelihood of disengagement (e.g. it is well known
that repressive measures can also be counterproductive20), and so must be viewed in relation
to other variables within the overall sequence and timing of events. To single out the
leadership variable at the collective level, Demant, Slootman, Buijs and Tillie21 point out that
disillusionment with leadership can lead to waning commitment and organisational
disintegration. Meanwhile, Ashour22 identifies strong, charismatic leadership as the most
crucial component of deliberate collective disengagement. Even when other variables were
present (external and internal communication, repression, and selective inducements),
disengagement in Egypt and Algeria was not successful unless directed by strong leaders.
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In addition to the nature of leadership, other key variables that are likely to be relevant
across different scenarios of collective disengagement include:23 1. Organisational structure
(a more united structure should facilitate internal communication and decrease the likelihood
of factionalising), 2. Clarity of goals (more concrete goals are more negotiable and it is easier
to recognise when they are not being achieved), 3. The nature of public support (widespread
condemnation is highly influential to a group‟s failing attractiveness, while being tied to a
particular ethnic/social identity may increase longevity), and 4. The existence of competing
groups (the extent to which other violent or non-violent groups represent attractive
alternatives). As Cronin observes, from a counter-terrorism perspective, “[t]he key is to work
synergistically with the dynamics of terrorist groups [and] to recognize the conditions under
which the [different factors identified] are either relevant or irrelevant to the exact
circumstances and nature of individual terrorist campaigns.”24
Individual Disengagement
Within the broader context of collective functioning it is also vitally important to have an
appreciation of the concerns of individual group members (and especially so for planning
programs of intervention that target individuals). As with collective disengagement, Horgan
points out that individual processes can take many forms and may be physical and/or
psychological, (either of which can arise in consequence from the other) as well as voluntary
or involuntary.25 Furthermore, disengagement does not necessarily involve outright exit from
a group, but can refer to role changes within an organisation (e.g. from combative to
logistical or supportive).26 Hence disengagement at the individual, as with the collective,
level must be seen as a process, not an event,27 and may involve numerous „failed‟ attempts
before being successful.
Based upon research and intervention with violent, right-wing youth groups, Bjørgo28
highlights a number of factors affecting individual disengagement, which are also relevant to
7
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terrorism. These are divided into „push‟ factors, which represent dissatisfaction with the
group, and include: 1. Negative experiences (stigmatisation, legal sanctions), 2. Loss of faith
in ideology or politics, 3. The feeling that things are going too far, especially regarding
violence, 4. Disillusionment with life inside the group (lack of loyalty, paranoia), 5. Loss of
status within the group, and 6. Exhaustion or „burn-out‟ under pressure. At the same time
there are „pull‟ factors, or alternative attractions, including: 1. Longing for a normal life, 2.
Feeling „too old‟ for high-risk, demanding activity, 3. Concern for career/future, and 4.
Family/relationship responsibilities.
In researching extremist groups in the Netherlands, Demant et al29 choose to dispense
with the distinction between „push‟ and „pull‟, but nevertheless draw attention to similar
factors. „Normative‟ (ideological) factors include rejection of violence, the realisation that the
desired future is not attainable, and a changing view of society (no longer seeing it as the
enemy, feeling a sense of belonging). „Affective‟ (social) factors affecting individual
disengagement include a grim atmosphere within the group, disappointment with peers or
leaders and internal disagreements. Finally, „continuance‟ (practical) factors are divided into
those with a direct effect and those with an indirect effect. Practical factors with a direct
effect include stigmatisation, external pressure and isolation (Bjørgo‟s push factors), whilst
being drawn to establish one‟s own life exerts an indirect effect (Bjørgo‟s pull factors).
Combined, the above authors30 also identify the following potential inhibitors or
barriers to disengagement: 1. Positive characteristics of the group (social-psychological
dependence, also highlighted as a major barrier at the collective level31), 2. Fear of negative
reprisals from other group members, 3. Loss of protection from former enemies, 4. Fear of
legal sanctions (being „snitched‟ on, pressure from police), 5. Perceived lack of social,
educational or vocational alternatives, 6. Loyalty to one‟s community and/or the cause, and 7.
„Sunk cost,‟ i.e. not wanting to feel like effort and costs so far have been for nothing.
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Alternatively, individual decisions to disengage can be facilitated by triggering events (often
a reaction to the use of violence and the futility of this as a tactic), and by significant others
who discourage violence.32
Implications
Even from a brief review of the different variables which affect collective and individual
disengagement it is clear that in reality these two processes cannot be separated. Individuals
are affected by actions of and upon their group, while the group as a whole is also affected by
the individual experiences of its members. Likewise, both are affected by, and in turn affect,
the wider environment in which they operate.33 From the point of view of designing a
program of intervention in order to facilitate individual disengagement and deradicalisation, it
is of course individual-level analysis that is of most interest. Whilst considering individual
motivations, however, it would seem prudent to pay close attention to group-members‟
organisational backgrounds, the current status/activities of the group or organisation(s) to
which they belong(ed), and any ongoing changes that might affect individual perceptions.
Having a broader contextual awareness is likely to prove invaluable to cultivating individual
disengagement, (and by the same token, any assessment of program efficacy must also
involve an appreciation of the wider social and political context34)
Bjørgo‟s35 „push‟/‟pull‟ distinction is useful in terms of emphasising the fact that
people may disengage (and ultimately deradicalise) both as a result of „things that are bad‟
about being engaged in high-risk collective action, and as a result of „things that are good‟
about alternatives. The suggestion that „push‟ factors have a more direct effect on decisions
to disengage is intriguing.36 This implies that interventions should focus on attempting to
make negative aspects of organisational involvement salient before presenting attractive
alternatives.
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Demant et al‟s37 identification of overlapping ideological, social and practical
concerns are also valuable. Firstly, rejection of ideology does seem to occur in some
instances but appears to play a very mixed role. For example, they report that individual
reassessments of worldview played a major role in individual disengagement from the Dutchbased Moluccan nationalist movement (no longer viewing violence as effective or legitimate,
no longer regarding the Dutch as their enemy, and reassessing the necessity and feasibility of
an independent Moluccan state).38 Likewise they report that among a small sample of former
(non-violent) Islamic radicals, rejection of the austere Salafi worldview and lifestyle and a
feeling of belonging to Dutch society were important.39
However, specific ideological concerns played less of a role for members of the leftwing squatters movement, and seemingly no role for former right-wing political activists
whose views had changed little, and only then as a result, rather than a cause of
disengagement.40 This echoes Bjørgo‟s assertion, commenting on violent right-wing groups,
that “it is probably more common that beliefs change after leaving the group, and as a
consequence, rather than before, and as a cause of leaving the group.”41
Since the focus here is upon rehabilitative intervention, it must be recognised that in
cases where participants are in custody, they are involuntarily physically disengaged. Simply
being removed from their former environment may increase susceptibility to „cognitive
openings‟42 that challenge their existing worldview, though conversely, beliefs may be
sustained via other detainees or a stubborn resolve inspired by the experience of detention
itself (and especially if treated harshly). A focus on ideology alone would therefore appear to
be a limited approach.
Social concerns appear to be at least as important as ideology with regards both to
radicalisation43 and disengagement (including potential barriers to disengagement).44 Hence
social attachments to other group members often precede ideological commitment and may
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exert a sense of obligation to continue even when disillusioned with the cause. On the other
hand, unsatisfactory group relations can sew seeds of discontent which ultimately lead to
decreased commitment and deradicalisation. Horgan45 points out in this regard that a
perceived mismatch between one‟s idealised preconceptions about life in the group and the
far less romantic reality can be a powerful experience.
From the point of view of intervention, again it is significant that participants may be
physically distanced from former comrades in that this may remove an important boost to
their resolve. However, in order to maximise the potential of this situation, a useful tactic
would be to use questioning techniques that lead individuals to reassess their old relations and
to realise where there is disparity between what they expected or were promised and what
they actually experienced. Moreover, the importance of social ties suggests the potential
utility that these may have within D&D programs, (perhaps in a similar manner to „peer
group therapy‟ interventions with ordinary offenders, which encourage a mutually supportive
culture among participants).46 This is in line with della Porta‟s suggestion that “[a]bove
all…exit paths from underground organizations appear to be influenced by the social
relationships of individuals… [and] departure is made easier when collective paths are
favoured.”47 This further implies that if old social ties are to be abandoned, new ones are
likely to be necessary to fill the void, and there is considerable agreement on this issue.48
This brings us to the closely related practical dimension of disengagement. At its
simplest this involves observation of the fact that people get tired of demanding and risky
activity, and at some point desire to attend to their individual prospects and other social
relations outside of the group (most notably partners and family). Hence it will make sense
for intervention programs to make alternative avenues in a security detainee‟s life salient,
attractive, and attainable. At the same time, some form of motivational assessment would
likely be useful. If an individual remains highly motivated towards their cause at the
11

Sam Mullins
continued expense of a possible „normal‟ life, then there is less likelihood of being induced
by „pull‟ factors. The challenge then appears to be in reliably identifying when an individual
is beginning to experience „burn-out,‟ or alternatively how to foster such feelings, and how
best to capitalise on this.
Existing Rehabilitation Programs for Islamist Extremists
The uniqueness and complexity of the different existing programs necessarily makes
meaningful evaluation impossible without taking an in-depth look at each individual
program. However, this level of detail is beyond the scope of the present article. Instead,
rather than describing individual intervention programs in great detail, the aim here is to
identify common themes in practice and areas for potential development. Interventions can
be and are implemented at three points in time49: 1. Prior to an offence being committed, 2.
During detention, and 3. Post-release. However, these distinctions are by no means always
clear since in some countries individuals are often detained despite having committed no
actual offence, and interventions that begin during detention often continue in some capacity
after release. Broadly speaking, it still makes sense to distinguish between preventive and
„rehabilitative‟ programs, and the focus here will primarily be upon the latter, which are
aimed at strongly suspected and incarcerated (if not convicted) Islamist „terrorists.‟
Barrett and Bokhari50 identify four main themes in current D&D programs. These are:
1. Re-education and rehabilitation, involving efforts to dissuade Islamist radicals from their
religious/political ideological beliefs and narrative, 2. Providing a legitimate lifestyle by way
of promoting family commitments and facilitating educational and vocational opportunities,
3. Use of amnesty and restorative justice, whereby lesser crimes are forgiven and extremists
sometimes meet with victims of terrorism, and 4. Creation of legitimate opportunities to vent
or address grievances, e.g. via group discussion. In addition to these a fifth theme is the use
of psychological counselling, and a sixth theme refers to program organisation (see below).
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Re-education and Rehabilitation
The first theme, addressing ideology through religious dialogue, has been heavily emphasised
in published accounts of most high-profile D&D programs for Islamist militants51 and
appears to have been a key concept behind the inception of „deradicalisation‟. Typically,
ideological persuasion involves using credible figures such as Islamic Sheikhs or scholars
(e.g. Saudi Arabia52) or former terrorists (e.g. Indonesia53) to discuss and debate individual
religious beliefs. The aim is to highlight „incorrect‟ beliefs, explain why they are mistaken
and show the „true‟ meaning of such key concepts as jihad, takfirism (denouncing other
Muslims) and living with non-Muslims. Most often the focus is upon the lack of theological
legitimacy for acts of terrorism and intolerance.54
It is important to note that the particular style of intervention and the emphasis that it
takes might vary for different individuals and is also likely to some extent to be culturally
unique. Hence programs being run in Europe appear to be employing slightly less –though
varying- emphasis on religion. For example, Vidino55 reports that in the Netherlands (a more
preventive program) more weight is given to promoting democratic values, and Demant56 and
colleagues see the promotion of alternative religious values as problematic for a secular state.
Nevertheless, reporting on the Amsterdam municipal approach, Mellis57 reports that radical
religious ideology is addressed in cases of more advanced radicalisation (similarly, in the US
program in Iraq, these efforts are reserved more for „hard-core‟ militants, based on the
reasoning that religious ideology is less relevant to „moderate‟ detainees58). Religious beliefs
are also targeted in pre-emptive interventions in Great Britain59 under the rubric of the
„Prevent‟ element of the national counter-terrorism strategy.60
Ideology has been highlighted in studies of „naturally occurring‟ deradicalisation (see
above) and has accordingly been targeted by intervention. The relative importance of this
component nevertheless remains debatable, as for example, one senior Indonesian police
13
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officer (whilst acknowledging individual differences) commented that socio-economic
approaches appear to be more effectual.61 Interestingly, disengagement efforts with rightwing extremists in Scandinavia and Germany pay little attention to ideology, and focus far
more on individuals‟ social and life circumstances.62 This brings us to the second major
theme of providing a legitimate lifestyle, and also highlights the fact that multi-modal
approaches (which do characterise many programs) are likely to be most effective.
Providing a Legitimate Lifestyle
Providing a legitimate lifestyle addresses practical, „pull‟ factors and involves an appreciation
of the importance of social networks. As with most themes covered by D&D programs, the
Saudi initiative seems to represent the most comprehensive, well-funded approach (not to
mention being the best-documented).63 Beginning with a subject‟s detention, the needs of
their family are assessed and a government stipend is provided based on the rationale that
detainees would otherwise be more resentful and uncooperative, and their family would be
more susceptible to radical influences. Families are also included within the rehabilitative
process, e.g. in forging a pact of mutual accountability such that family members will be held
responsible if a former detainee absconds or re-offends.64 Once the main counselling segment
of the program is completed and an individual moves from detention through a halfway house
(called the „Care Rehabilitation Centre‟) and on to being released, he is offered education,
vocational training, benefits, help finding accommodation, access to a vehicle, and even help
getting married.65
Of course –ethical/philosophical debates aside- the level of assistance that is offered is
greatly dependent upon available resources, which are generally not as abundant as in Saudi
Arabia. Singapore has also put together a rather comprehensive intervention package,
extending many of the same benefits as the Saudis by way of numerous non-governmental
partnership agencies.66 The US program in Iraq provides literacy training, basic education
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and vocational skills.67 Meanwhile in the Netherlands and UK, multi-agency networks have
been established to tackle radicalism in communities, widely incorporating non-governmental
organisations (NGOs) as part of locally coordinated projects.68 Among the services offered
for at-risk youths are vocational skills training, mentoring programs and „diversionary‟ trips
and activities.
The need to establish a legitimate life has not gone unappreciated, but a balance is
required. The Saudi approach seems to involve a „no-expenses spared‟ attitude that is
arguably over-rewarding their detainees and may be an inefficient use of resources. For those
with less comprehensive funding (or who are simply less organised) there is also the danger
that failing to provide benefits –especially if promised- will lead to a backlash in militant or
criminal activity, whether for ideological or financial reasons.69
For example, Ribetti reports that the demobilisation scheme for paramilitaries in
Colombia, whilst still having positive effects, suffered in its early stages because of “an
absolute lack of planning on the part of the government”.70 Benefits were not available
according to schedule, leaving many ex-militants in difficult financial circumstances, and
there was poor matching of individuals to appropriate training programs (e.g. many were
unable to complete vocational training since they lacked necessary basic education). Similar
concerns have been raised by Islamist ex-militants in Yemen71 and in Algeria, with one
former fighter remarking, “I know militants who repented who have resumed Jihad because
they were unable to work and live”.72 Another Algerian, a former local commander of the
Green Death Phalanx described the situation as “administrative terrorism” commenting that
“[it] prevents you from having access to basic things such as getting a passport (or) a birth
certificate for your child who was born in the mountains…We feel excluded and no one
wants to listen to us. This is not fair”.73
Amnesty and Restorative Justice
15
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Descriptions of the use of amnesty and restorative justice within the context of D&D
programs for individuals have been much less comprehensive. Amnesty appears to be
employed more often as a large-scale demobilisation tactic (e.g. as in Italy, Colombia, Egypt,
or Algeria). In such cases the widespread offer of amnesty has been either the basis of first
contact between governments and militants wishing to disengage, or else has affected the
release of imprisoned militants in recognition of collective disengagement.
The use of amnesty within D&D programs in order to influence individual
psychology and behaviour is less clear. For example, Boucek74 reports that detainees who
successfully complete the Saudi rehabilitation program are then eligible for release, except
for those with „blood on their hands‟. He goes on to say that those with time left on their
sentence will not be released early.75 This implies that only those who have not been formally
sentenced are eligible for „amnesty,‟ and for those who have been sentenced, there is less
incentive to bother taking part, but also less incentive to feign genuine participation if they
do.
The general rule appears to be that clemency may apply to less serious crimes only,76
and is used at the discretion of the relevant authorities. It may involve not only legal
pardoning but may also necessitate protection or relocation of individuals in order to avoid
persecution or reprisals from enemies.77 Theoretically, amnesty shows compassion and has
the potential to change individual „us and them‟ worldviews. In accordance with labelling
theory,78 it also offers a fresh start, a chance to focus on a new life ahead. In practice, its
effects are likely to be difficult to assess and must strike a balance between goals of
deradicalisation, which it is indirectly related to, and the need for justice, most notably the
concerns of victims of terrorism. This latter point links in with the notion of restorative
justice and the potential to address the needs of victims whilst potentially furthering
individual rehabilitation.
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Barrett and Bokhari mention that some programs do employ restorative justice tactics,
however, they do not provide details. Ali Imron has publicly stated that he will “never stop”
asking for forgiveness from victims and their families,79 but detailed descriptions of meetings
between terrorists and victims of terrorism are lacking. Beg and Bokhari80 mention an
initiative in Iraq where jihadis were encouraged to confess to their crimes and meet with the
mothers of people they had killed. Carroll81 describes one such meeting:
“"You burned my heart!" wailed the mother of a murdered son, jabbing a large,
unshaven man in the chest."May God burn your heart! What kind of religion do you
have?" He stared at his feet, avoiding her eyes.”
Yet this particular initiative is a rather controversial televised affair, sometimes
clearly involving elements of coercion82 (and does not appear to be related to the US-run
program for security detainees83). In Northern Ireland it has also been reported that efforts at
restorative justice have been “largely unsuccessful” and have sometimes caused “significant
tensions”.84 Shenk‟s85 description of restorative justice with ordinary criminals gives more
insight into how these sorts of meeting might be productive. She argues that victim-offender
mediation, where the two parties engage in a series of supervised meetings and work together
towards a mutually acceptable reconciliation, has great potential in the sphere of hate-crimes.
In particular it may help offenders realise the impact of their crimes and humanise their view
of the „enemy,‟ making repeat offences less likely, whilst giving victims a sense of emotional
„closure‟. This provides some support as well as guidelines for application with terrorists, but
has yet to be firmly established in this field, or indeed with hate-crime offenders.86 As with
D&D programs in general, it is imperative that such efforts are described in more detail and
made available for assessment.
Creation of Legitimate Opportunities to Voice Concerns
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This is another strategy that has been more obviously applied as part of large-scale
government efforts to combat terrorism. In particular this is seen in dealings with specific
terrorist organisations by facilitating the inclusion of political wings in mainstream politics,
such as in Northern Ireland. It seems to be something that numerous Islamist groups at
varying stages of disengagement desire, but that has rarely been granted.87 As a counterterrorism strategy, it is supported by the fact that for many, terrorism is the first resort.88
Often terrorists will not have tried alternative means of affecting change, and may therefore
be open to less harmful and more effective strategies.
Regarding D&D interventions, the only example utilising this strategy cited by Barrett
and Bokhari89 is the Tajik Secular-Islamic Dialogue Project. The Tajik project brings together
different groups within society to seek “means of coexistence and to identify and discuss
issues that create mistrust and tension”90 and to establish solutions. It apparently does not,
however, include more radical, violent Islamists. Efforts in the Netherlands and UK also try
to create legitimate opportunities in so far as they promote democratic participation. These
are more preventative projects though, and so the encouragement of legitimate means of
protest remains untested within the realms of individual rehabilitation. In addition it is
important to bear in mind that if such opportunities are essentially „empty‟ and do not result
in any change, they may simply fuel frustration and eventually lead to a return to violence. It
is thus important for ex-militants to have realistic expectations about the nature of nonviolent political activism.
Psychological Counselling
A number of programs utilise mental health professionals to evaluate participants and to
address any needs or disorders that they may have. For example, the Saudi program includes
a team of psychologists responsible for assessing psychological well-being and genuineness
of program participation as well as establishing relations with detainees‟ families.91 In the
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more intensive program they also help provide courses on self-esteem.92 Psychologists are
also involved in Singapore‟s program and about eighty percent of the Religious
Rehabilitation Group that plays the primary role there has undergone training in
psychological counselling to improve their ability to understand and relate to participants.93
Meanwhile in Iraq, the US program addresses a host of potential psychological traumas
experienced by many individuals during the course of the conflict as well as their
incarceration, and further attends to their “sense of identity, meaningfulness, life mission and
future purpose”.94
The role of psychological expertise is clearly quite varied according to context but
seems to focus on building relations, evaluation and treatment. On the one hand these efforts
have intuitive appeal; however regarding treatment in particular, it is pertinent to note that
there is no clear relationship between psychological disorder and terrorism.95 Although this
may be significantly different in conflict zones, there is a general risk of developing a
„shotgun approach‟ to rehabilitation: selecting issues to assess and treat without reference to
their theoretical relevance to terrorist behaviour, and thereby losing focus and wasting
resources. Psychological counselling, in common with other areas of terrorist rehabilitation,
thus warrants a great deal more research before it can be evaluated in any meaningful way.
Program Organisation
In addition to the above themes of content it is necessary to review organisational aspects of
intervention. As mentioned already there is some variation in terms of governmental
involvement. Pragmatically speaking this is likely to affect funding. For right-wing
extremists, Bjørgo et al96 report that government programs also tend to exert more control
over participants and have a greater capacity to monitor them for signs of recidivism (making
„failures‟ all the more visible). They advise that it is important to strike a balance between
control and trust, the latter being more forthcoming in non-governmental programs.
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Government involvement may thus affect initial levels of trust in the scheme from
program participants. It is obviously less likely that militants will listen to the ideological or
religious interpretations of people they believe are their opponents. In reality though, even
non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in this context must have government approval to
be involved and are arguing for a position that is in line with state reasoning vis-à-vis
terrorism. Even NGOs are not beyond suspicion.
The key to overcoming this scepticism appears to be how detainees are treated and
how messages are communicated to them. In Indonesia, where the police play an important
role in the initiative, officers are courteous and respectful, and take time out to pray alongside
extremists as fellow Muslims. This helps to break down misconceptions of the police as
thoghut or un-Islamic, which may be an important first step to opening up lines of
communication.97 Similarly, in Saudi Arabia there is a clear distinction between interrogation
and later stages of „help,‟ but a persisting emphasis upon „being nice‟ to prisoners. The idea is
to get across to them that they are not being punished, but rather that they have been led
astray and need to be helped back onto the correct Islamic path.98 This appears to be a
common approach in the Muslim world.99 Western authorities can also try to erode
misconceptions through compassionate actions, and employ Muslims in combating
extremism.100 But the challenge is slightly different in that the government itself is not
Islamic and it may therefore be harder to close the distance between them.
In line with the psychology of persuasion, it is thus important to attend to both the
content and the source of the messages being advocated.101 Program staff members must be
credible, and therefore tend to include Muslim scholars or Sheikhs, and sometimes exextremists. Generally speaking though, D&D programs are a multi-disciplinary affair. In
addition to security personnel and Islamic „counsellors,‟ professionals with a psychological
background are also directly involved in some interventions (see above). This is likely to be
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an important component of best practice in order to ensure a thorough approach. However, it
will be vital for multi-disciplinary teams to show effective coordination for continuity in any
program. Moreover, multiple agencies –both governmental and non-governmental- may be
involved at different points throughout a detainee‟s procession through the state system.
There is thus likely to be varying levels of communication and coordination, and the potential
for competing interests between different parties.
Continuing Issues in the Rehabilitation of Islamist Militants
Perhaps the three biggest, interrelated issues for D&D programs concern who the participants
are, risk assessment, and definitions and measurement of success. It seems that across the
board it has so far primarily been relatively low-level militants who have not been involved
in actual terrorist attacks who have participated and been released. This is not to say that
more committed, hard-core extremists with a history of violence have been entirely
excluded,102 but they appear to have been very much in the minority, and are far less likely to
be offered early release.103 The questions which hang over these programs then, are how
extreme participants so far have really been, what risk they have presented, and what
behavioural and psychological changes have resulted from taking part?
Adequate data to begin answering these questions are not yet available. Beyond very
limited descriptions of detainees (young men, mostly held for minor offences such as
possessing or distributing Islamist propaganda), there has not been any publicised breakdown
of particular offence-frequencies, of period of involvement with Islamist militants, roles
played within organisations, or specific attitudes and beliefs that are held. As argued by
Kruglanski and Gelfand,104 there is a need to develop repeat attitudinal measures in order to
assess changes over time. They also point out that factors such as personal history,
organisational embeddedness, current conditions, family situation, and personality variables
(such as need for social dominance or tolerance for ambiguity) may all affect resilience to
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change. Likewise, Speckhard asserts that programs must develop reliable ways of classifying
program participants according to their level of radicalisation and that this requires an
assessment tool to be used before, during and after treatment.105 Unless such data are
recorded and measures of change are devised, program appraisals will remain relatively
unsophisticated.106
At present, risk-assessment generally appears to be a case of clinical judgement by
those responsible for implementing specific programs and involves taking stock of a number
of different factors which do not necessarily involve any clear, standardised system of
measurement, nor do they necessarily relate to one another –or to theoretical explanations of
terrorism- in any systematic way. In both mental health practice more generally, and in
rehabilitation efforts with ordinary offenders, clinical judgement has been shown to be
inferior to actuarial assessment using standardised tools that are structured, quantitative, and
linked to relevant criteria.107 There is clearly a desperate need for improvement in the
assessment of terrorists (more below) and accordingly, current research is addressing this
issue. Speckhard, and Kruglanski and Gelfand are clearly pioneering in this respect but
precise details of their methods have yet to be published. Of particular note in this area is
Pressman‟s work in developing the Violent Extremism Risk Assessment (VERA), which is
an attempt at establishing a Structured Professional Judgement (SPJ) tool for use with
terrorist populations.108 Pressman‟s approach is a prime example of the underlying argument
in this paper (i.e. that terrorism researchers can learn from criminology) in that it is inspired
by existing, validated SPJ tools for violent offenders, and yet the particular content of the
assessment is appropriately informed by theory and research on terrorism. Although still in
the early stages of development this is a step in the right direction.
Program success is undoubtedly related to who participants are, and what risk they
pose. It may also incorporate varying levels of intermediate and superseding goals.
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Intermediate goals might include behavioural changes whilst incarcerated (e.g. increased
interaction and openness with staff) as well as changes in self-reported attitudes. The
ultimate, ideal goal is of course permanent behavioural disengagement from involvement
with Islamist terrorists- no collaboration with them, no supporting or promoting them, and
especially no violence. The focus thus far has been upon recidivism in terms of committing a
security-related offence; however details have been vague and it is unclear whether the
distinction is always made between suspicion, arrest, conviction or some other form of
confirmation. Table 1 below illustrates known numbers of participants, releases and repeat
offenders in current D&D programs where some information is available.109

Table 1. Numbers of participants, releases & repeat offenders in current D&D programs up
until the end of 2007 (mid-2008 for Iraq).

* Release confirmed as direct result of D&D program.

It is important to note that only in the cases of Saudi Arabia and Yemen110 are the
releases explicitly cited to be a direct result of program participation (e.g. the 150 released in
Indonesia were largely part of general amnesties111). These two cases and that of Iraq are the
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only ones for which rates of recidivism have been reported (it was more recently made public
that at least 14 individuals jailed for terrorism offences in Indonesia have reoffended, but it is
unclear whether they were among those released prior to 2008112). In the case of Saudi Arabia
these numbers refer to individuals re-arrested for security-related offences.113 Meanwhile in
Yemen recidivism figures refer to two former program participants killed in Iraq114 and it is
unspecified what the 12 Iraqis listed were rearrested for. These translate into extremely low
rates of recidivism, and although figures are not reported for the other cases it is worth noting
that there are high levels of monitoring and continued restrictions on the movements of
former detainees in these countries.
Nevertheless, since base-rates of re-offending are unknown for populations of
terrorists, and there are no control groups for comparison, these rates do not necessarily
reflect a significant effect of the respective interventions. Speckhard reports that prior to the
implementation of the program in Iraq, “the usual recidivism rate from previous years [was]
close to 200”,115 which is encouraging but this by itself cannot be considered a measurement
of efficacy. The period of time since released –especially without supervision- is also
unknown, but likely no more than two or three years in the longest cases. Finally, offences
committed in relation to original offences are unknown- for example an increase in severity
might indicate a detrimental effect of intervention for those individuals, whilst a decrease
might still be considered a positive effect despite „failure.‟ Degrees of recidivism therefore
need to be defined.
Summary of Existing Programs
In summary, existing programs vary a great deal in almost every respect. A focus on ideology
and religion has so far been the most promoted aspect of programs, and a great deal of effort
has been put into enlisting credible sources of information or program interlocutors116, and
developing convincing arguments. Based on theoretical understanding of involvement in
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extremist organisations, and accounts of why people leave them, it is also vitally important to
address social concerns, which most programs do. It is tempting to compare these two
approaches and ask which is most useful, however this would be counterproductive and miss
the point that both are important, and it is the combination that is most likely to be effective.
Other approaches, such as restorative justice techniques, and providing alternative avenues of
expression are certainly promising but are as yet underutilised and poorly documented, while
psychological counselling techniques, although potentially valuable, are not always clearly
theoretically relevant or coordinated.
A commendable point is that programs do appear to some extent to utilise the
potential for groups of individuals to support each other‟s individual rehabilitation. This is
apparent in the fact that intervention seems to typically involve a good deal of group
interaction. However, there may yet be further opportunities to cultivate mutual self-helping
(e.g. by way of enlisting the help of detainees who are further along in the program to
welcome newcomers). Equally, the potential for negative influences within groups must be
recognised and plans for dealing with this developed.
Referring to other theoretical implications, discussed above, there are no reports that
the collective situation of relevant terrorist organisations are monitored in order to be
exploited in facilitating individual reform (although this might still take place in practice).
Also, there is only limited evidence that program staff attempt to highlight negative aspects
of extremist involvement (though again, intuitively this seems likely). One example is the
Saudi effort, which includes an emphasis upon ways in which recruits are manipulated by
terrorist organisations.117
There is a continued need to improve risk assessment and to be able to identify and
cultivate feelings of burn-out, neither of which are dealt with in detail in existing descriptions
of D&D programs. Finally, from an academic and perhaps idealistic perspective (since this
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conflicts with security-related and political concerns) there is a great need to improve the
quality of available information in order to facilitate more accurate evaluation. Indeed, the
preceding overview belies the complexity involved in each program and detailed case studies
are required in order to advance current levels of understanding. Moving beyond individual
assessments in the search for common factors relating to positive outcomes, analysts will also
be faced with the challenge of coming up with a framework that is able to accommodate the
vast differences between programs. Horgan and Braddock suggest that Multi Attribute Utility
Theory (MAUT) might be useful in this regard, although they acknowledge that it is a
daunting task.118
Initial, optimistic impressions of these interventions have been based on extremely
limited data and an understandable enthusiasm for a new and exciting area of innovation in
counter-terrorism. However, as practitioners and analysts come to grips with the complexity
of conceptual issues involved, the general outlook has become more critical.119 Although
rehabilitation programs for ordinary offenders are by no means free from controversy, there is
a wealth of relevant experience, theoretical development and research that can be drawn
upon, that may help clarify certain concepts and inspire new ways of thinking about
rehabilitating terrorists.
Rehabilitation Programs with Ordinary Offenders
Having described key themes in practice with Islamist terrorists, it is useful to consider how
these programs compare to the rehabilitation of ordinary offenders. Whilst this is an
extremely diverse field120 that is far from being an exact science, there is over fifty
cumulative years of research to build upon. Of course working with „everyday‟ criminals and
terrorists is not the same, and rehabilitation programs cannot simply be cut and pasted from
one context to the other. But with careful consideration for similarities and differences (in
terms of subjects, content, organisation and culture), it is possible that those with an interest
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in D&D programs can learn from the experience of criminology. In particular this may help
to highlight the multitude of conceptual and practical issues involved, to mould realistic
expectations about the challenges ahead, and to generate ideas for improving current practice
and evaluation. Specific offender rehabilitation programs (such as Reasoning and
Rehabilitation, Sex Offender Treatment Programs) are of interest and are worth examining on
an individual basis. However, the nature of offences and the specific content of programs will
always be different. Therefore the aim here is to give an overview of principles of best
practice in criminal rehabilitation, as well as relevant challenges. This will be followed by a
consideration of the extent to which these principles might apply to working with Islamist
terrorists.
A Brief History of Criminal Rehabilitation
Psychological approaches to offender rehabilitation gained momentum in the 1950‟s and
‟60‟s. However, from the 1970‟s onwards the idea that „nothing works‟ took hold, based
upon a particular review of treatment by Martinson.121 This conclusion was later recanted and
the original paper criticised,122 but at the time it gelled with a shift to the political right in the
US and UK, and with sociological theories pointing to the role of society over individuals in
causing crime (criminology‟s „root causes‟).123 There was a resurgence in the rehabilitative
ideal in both policy and practice during the 1990‟s, inspired by a growing body of metaanalytical reviews demonstrating a consistent impact upon recidivism.124 Since then a
plethora of rehabilitative programs has emerged, some targeting specific types of offender,
others more generalised.
Efficacy
Amidst the diversity of programs in existence there is variation in subjects (different types of
offenders) content, organisation, setting, quality of implementation, and „dosage‟ (average
time spent in treatment). Program evaluations are similarly diverse, methods of measurement
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and chosen criteria vary widely, and detail is often lacking, making it difficult to discern
meaning from individual assessments or to compare multiple studies. In trying to overcome
the shortcomings of individual studies criminologists have used meta-analysis to
quantitatively assess program efficacy at the aggregate level. This enables calculation of an
overall effect size125 on recidivism despite varying operational definitions in different studies,
and further enables researchers to establish correlations between factors of interest (e.g.
different types of offenders) and the overall result, thus indicating whether or not they have a
moderating effect on treatment.126 Although this is not currently feasible to evaluate D&D
programs (a minimum requirement is a significant number of detailed assessments with
relatively large samples)127 it is widely used in criminology. The average effect size produced
in meta-analytical review is a reduction between ten and twelve percent in recidivism across
different types of offenders compared to matched control groups.128
This may not seem impressive but nevertheless represents a significant impact in
terms of costs to individuals and society. Moreover, meta-analysis of the effects of punitive
approaches and incarceration consistently demonstrate that this does not reduce recidivism,
and in fact often increases rates of re-offending (Lipsey and Cullen129 found this kind of
boomerang effect in 5 out of 7 meta-analyses of incarceration). Furthermore, programs which
adhere to increasingly established principles of best practice (see below) have been shown to
reduce recidivism on average by 17-35%.130 The context of this result is that studies often
report quite high rates of recidivism among criminal populations- it is not uncommon to come
across reports of more than 40% of control groups being rearrested or even reconvicted
within 12 months of release, with increasing likelihood of recidivism over the next couple of
years.131
In a UK Home Office study examining the effects of Cognitive Behavioural
Treatment (CBT) for a variety of different adult offenders, reconviction rates at two-year
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follow up among the control groups ranged from 8% to 80% depending upon risk-level (for
the treatment groups this range was 5% to 75% but with larger reductions occurring in
medium risk-level groups).132 Recidivism is thus a serious problem among criminal
populations and is not easily overcome: indeed, despite continued efforts to improve criminal
rehabilitation –and even under ideal circumstances- it is taken as a given that an often
significant proportion of criminals will reoffend. What‟s more, precisely who will and will
not reoffend cannot be predicted with absolute certainty.133
Despite overall consensus that criminal rehabilitation can be effective, there are some
important caveats. Critics of the findings from meta-analysis point out that these results are
potentially misleading since they are mostly based on programs which have been set up
specifically for demonstration and research.134 As such they have adequate resources and are
often run by the researchers who designed the program, along with appropriately trained staff
(„therapeutic integrity‟- see below), while „real life‟, „routine‟ programs face numerous
organisational difficulties, they experience „drift‟ away from the original plan over time, and
have been found to produce a mean effect size half that of research programs.135 Similarly,
Lowenkamp136 found that the vast majority of almost 400 individual offender treatment
programs assessed using the Correctional Program Assessment Inventory (CPAI-2000) did
not receive a passing grade, and Gendreau, Goggin and Smith137 report that seventy percent
of 282 programs assessed using an earlier version of the CPAI also „failed‟. The gap between
theory and research on one hand, and practice on the other, is thought to be “enormous” (see
Gendreau et al138 for specific program deficits) and one of the greatest challenges for
researchers in this field is trying to bridge that gap.139
A related point that is important to appreciate is that the positive effects found in
meta-analysis are at the aggregate level. Lipsey and Cullen thus point out that “no [particular]
programs or program types have been identified that consistently produce positive effects”140
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[emphasis added]. Criminologists are thus still striving to improve their understanding of
rehabilitation and have devoted considerable effort to identifying factors which relate to more
successful treatments (larger effect sizes on recidivism) within meta-analyses. This had led to
the identification of several principles of best practice.
What Works and What Doesn’t
Despite an inability to come up with the „perfect‟ program, general agreement has now
emerged as to the components of more (and less) effective rehabilitative interventions.141
Less effective –sometimes even counterproductive- practices include psychodynamic or nondirective therapies, a focus on punishment, and a failure to address issues related to
offending.
The following are consistently cited as being more effective at reducing recidivism:142


Adherence to principles of Risk, Need, and Responsivity (RNR, see below).



Cognitive-behavioural interventions (focus on rewarding appropriate behaviour,
behavioural practice and role-play, addressing pro-criminal attitudes, enhancing
relevant cognitive skills).



A firm-but-fair and interpersonally sensitive approach to participants.



A structured, well-designed program based on empirically validated theory (usually
incorporating elements of social learning theory).



High quality training of staff.



High treatment integrity (the extent to which the program is conducted according to
theory and design).



A conducive setting (community-based programs are often found to be more
effective).

The Risk Principle
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The principles of „Risk‟, „Need‟ and „Responsivity‟ have been developed by Andrews and
colleagues and are believed to lie at the heart of best practice.143 Thus Bonta and Andrews144
found that programs adhering to all three RNR principles produced larger reductions in
recidivism (which were further increased in community settings).
The Risk principle states that more intense levels of service provision should be
reserved for higher-risk offenders since there is more room for change and this results in
greater reductions in recidivism. Treatment of higher-risk offenders has been found to relate
to larger reductions in recidivism in meta-analysis,145 while focussing efforts on lower risk
offenders can sometimes result in increased rates of reoffending (since this increases their
criminal peer-associations)146. However, Smith et al‟s147 review of meta-analyses reveals that
the support on this issue is inconsistent as compared to other factors, which they suggest is
due to varying definitions of risk-level and paucity of available information in studies.
Risk-assessment tools have advanced from „first generation‟ (unstructured clinical
judgement) through to „fourth generation‟ (theoretically and empirically derived, including
both static and dynamic factors for repeated measurement, and designed to inform the
rehabilitation process through identifying specific „criminogenic needs‟, i.e. issues relating to
offending behaviour, which can be targeted in intervention).148 The improvements over
clinical judgement are unquestionable149, and researchers are generally able to distinguish
between high, medium and low-risk categories of offenders150; however the overall predictive
ability of risk-assessment tools remains only moderately accurate, no single instrument or
type of assessment has been found to be superior151 and practitioners have been slow to adopt
new technology.152
The Need Principle
The Need principle states that interventions must target „criminogenic needs‟, i.e.
factors which directly relate to offending behaviour (and therefore are indicative of risk).
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Andrews, Bonta and Wormith identify eight empirically supported risk/need factors, which
they refer to as the „Central Eight‟. The „Big Four‟ among these „criminogenic‟ variables
include:


Offence history,



Antisocial personality traits (such as impulsivity and aggressiveness),



Pro-criminal attitudes (including rationalisations for crime), and



Social support for crime (criminal associates, lack of „pro-social‟
associates).153

Among these variables, only offence history is static and therefore unchangeable. The
inclusion of dynamic factors enables repeated assessment of change and therefore of
treatment impact over time. The remaining four risk/need factors are also dynamic and
include: individual substance abuse, family/marital relationships, school or work life, and
leisure activities.154 Importantly, several minor, „non-criminogenic‟ needs are also identified,
which if targeted in intervention may improve an individual‟s well-being, but are unlikely to
affect offending behaviour. These include self-esteem, personal/emotional distress, major
mental disorder, and physical health.155 Smith et al report that although relatively few metaanalyses have been conducted which specifically examine the need principle, the current
evidence is strongly supportive.156
The Responsivity Principle
Lastly, the principle of Responsivity states that programs must be implemented in a
style that maximises learning potential. General responsivity calls for the use of cognitivebehavioural techniques and social learning, utilising such methods as modelling, gradual
shaping of behaviour through reinforcement and identification and modification of
maladaptive thought patterns via cognitive restructuring. Specific responsivity suggests that
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treatment delivery (including matching subjects to suitable staff members) must be adapted to
suit individual offender characteristics.157 Smith et al‟s recent review of meta-analytical
studies reveals that cognitive-behavioural interventions for offenders have been consistently
found to result in greater reductions in recidivism than interventions that do not employ these
methods. Specific responsivity, however, remains under-researched.
Program Design, Implementation and Evaluation
RNR principles and other recommendations relating to style of delivery can be
considered content variables. Meanwhile, organisational variables relate to issues of design,
implementation and evaluation. Cooke and Philip158 provide an extremely useful breakdown
of how to ensure treatment integrity through solid organisation and although some of their
advice might seem generic (e.g. need for adequate resources, potential negative impact of
intra-organisational conflict) a thorough approach avoids making assumptions and ensures
that details are not overlooked. Three key areas stand out as particularly relevant: 1. The
theoretical framework should be empirically validated, and what exactly will be targeted –
and how- must be clearly identified; 2. There must be a comprehensive program manual that
is well-researched and details the design, setting up, running and evaluation of the program
(including such details as number of planned sessions, and how to achieve stated objectives);
and 3. Monitoring and evaluation of all aspects of the programs are fundamentally important
to its success. The latter helps maintain program integrity and assessment of whether the
intervention is affecting a) short-term process variables, b) outcome variables or ultimate
goals, and c) whether it is cost-effective.159
Gendreau, Goggin and Smith160 take an equally detailed approach in offering advice
on the implementation of programs in the „real world‟ and identify four key areas to attend to
relating to organisational factors, the program itself, the agent of change (who is responsible
for running the program), and staffing activities.161 They also emphasise the importance of
33

Sam Mullins
program evaluation and suggest the use of the CPAI for this purpose. The latest version of
this tool, the CPAI-2000,162 includes 131 items and assesses eight different domains: 1.
Organisational culture, 2. Program implementation/maintenance, 3. Management/staff
characteristics, 4. Client risk-need practices, 5. Program characteristics, 6. Core correctional
practices, 7. Interagency communication, and 8. Evaluation. CPAI scores have been found to
relate to reductions in recidivism, thus adding validity both to this assessment, and by proxy
to the „what works‟ literature on which it is based.163

How Might General Principles of Criminal Rehabilitation Apply to D&D Programs
with Islamist Terrorists?
Although the potential relevance of criminology has not been overlooked,164 there has not
previously been any systematic attempt to explore how principles of best practice in ordinary
rehabilitation might apply to similar efforts with Islamist terrorists. Before elaborating on
what specific lessons might be learned from criminology it is useful to briefly consider in
what ways populations of criminals and terrorists are similar and different, with an eye to
assessing transferability.
Comparison of Populations
In terms of profiles, terrorists are overwhelmingly males. Although females do make up a
larger comparative proportion of criminal populations, males are responsible for more crime
overall –especially violent crime- and most research is with male offenders.165
It is generally accepted that terrorists on the whole are free from psychopathology and
rates of disorder are low.166 While “a third or more of prisoners show some form of mental
disorder…this is mainly a reflection of high rates of alcohol and drug abuse and personality
disorder…[and] these are the disorders whose status as mental illnesses is contentious within
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psychiatry.”167 Although it is sometimes reported that prisoners‟ rates are higher,168 overall
“[i]t is unclear whether the rates of disorder in prisoners are significantly different from
general population rates.”169 Criminologists may be faced more often with the added
difficulty of treating some form of disorder as part of rehabilitation. However, except for
antisocial personality traits, these are likely to be secondary goals, while primary targets
remain „criminogenic needs‟ (see above) and the overall design of these programs is aimed at
being generally appropriate for human consumption.170
A further concern might be to do with socioeconomic background. We are reminded
time and again that terrorists are extremely heterogeneous and many often come from middle
or even upper classes, with good education and sometimes a professional career. Criminal
populations are also extremely diverse, but tend to be typified as being from lower classes
with poor education and below average IQ.171 This might imply that style of intervention
should be quite different to suit apparent differences in learning ability.
However, it should be noted that upper class Islamist militants were more prevalent at
the beginning of the movement, and have become less prevalent over time, so that the
majority of „foot soldiers‟ (likely to make up the bulk of participants in D&D programs) are
lower or middle class.172 In the Saudi program, only a very small proportion of participants
have come from more affluent backgrounds, and in a study of 639 of these, around a quarter
had a criminal background.173 This is the same proportion reported among Bakker‟s sample
of operational („hard-core‟) Islamist terrorists in Europe.174
Hence there is considerable overlap in criminal and terrorist populations. Based on
this, there is no evidence to suggest that criminals and terrorists have fundamentally different
cognitive styles with respect to capacity to learn or resistance to change, and the limited
evidence that does exist suggests that if there are differences, they may well be marginal.
Indeed, the definitive nature of participants should not be assumed one way or the other, but
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assessed at intake and dealt with accordingly (hence the need for some flexibility and
individual tailoring of treatment).
It is also worth noting that criminals and terrorists show a great deal of similarity in a
number of other ways. In particular they show similar systems of social influence and
organisation, they show similar pathways into their respective illegal activities, and their
specific sense of social identity is also important.175 Perhaps the most significant difference
from a psychological perspective is in particular aspects of social identity. The fact that
terrorists feel that they represent a wider collective, and that they often have altruistic,
politicised motivations, separates them from most criminals. However, this should be looked
upon as a potential asset to be exploited in rehabilitative interventions, for example in
promoting alternative avenues of pro-social action.
Finally, LaFree and Miller176 recently explored the utility of criminological accounts
of desistance in ordinary offenders for understanding similar processes in terrorism, and
found this to be a useful theoretical approach. Similarly, Horgan177 explores the concept of
„secondary‟ (i.e. long-term) desistance in ordinary criminals for understanding terrorist
disengagement. Hence there are parallels apparent in criminal and terrorist
desistance/disengagement, and they may cease their respective activities for some of the same
reasons.
As a caveat, it is not the intention here to suggest that criminal and terrorist
populations are the same (even within broad samples), that differences are not significant, or
that practice with offenders will directly apply to Islamist militants. Rather, the aim is to
demonstrate that there is sufficient similarity that lessons learned from working with ordinary
offenders will be relevant to working with Islamist terrorists, although the exact structure and
content of programs will always be context-specific. Indeed, even though Pressman
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emphasises the differences between the two populations, she comes to the same conclusion in
this respect.178
Applicability of Principles of Best Practice
Firstly, in terms of what doesn’t work with ordinary offenders, the same seems likely to hold
true for terrorists. There is no reason to believe that psychodynamic or nondirective
approaches, a punitive approach, or failing to address needs directly related to militant
behaviour will be effective in D&D programs. These are important lessons to learn given that
such approaches can sometimes increase recidivism, which would be disastrous. „What not to
do‟ is thus crucial, and although it applies across different areas of intervention, it may be
particularly relevant to psychological counselling with Islamist terrorists. The issue is not
only how any psychological disorders or deficits are addressed but also whether or not they
are relevant to offending behaviour, and whether they represent appropriate targets for
intervention aimed at reducing recidivism. This will likely be context-specific and will
require careful research. We now turn to „what works‟ in criminology.
Risk
Regarding the Risk principle, the question remains as to whether it would be more
productive to focus upon higher risk (more committed) cases. Of course, as with criminals,
there are those who are beyond rehabilitation, but “[e]ven the beliefs of deeply committed
extremists may be subject to more change than we have expected.”179 Yet D&D interventions
so far seem to have shied away from higher risk cases (except for those who have seemingly
„self-rehabilitated‟), and there is thus a good possibility that resources are being used
inefficiently. Accounts of the programs in Singapore and Iraq do mention that different levels
of risk are distinguished;180 however, in order to assess whether the Risk principle applies in
terrorism, it is first necessary to develop reliable and valid risk-assessment tools. This follows
Kruglanski and Gelfand‟s181 argument for a „deradicalisation index‟ and Pressman‟s182 efforts
37

Sam Mullins
to develop a risk-assessment tool for „violent political extremists‟. Risk-assessment must take
into account issues such as militant history (roles played and length of time in the
organisation), which is static, but also dynamic factors such as specific patterns of ideological
belief, (which may be reflected in use of language as reflected in „explanatory styles‟ or
„personal narratives‟183). It should include an assessment of motivations for initial and
continued involvement (economic, ideological/ religious, and social), as well as motivation
for changing one‟s current situation („readiness‟ for disengagement). This should form the
corner stone of treatment design for specific individuals.184
Without detracting from the importance of developing systematic risk-assessment for
Islamist militants, it is equally important to have realistic expectations about what such tools
might achieve. Decades of research and practice with ordinary offenders has achieved only
moderate predictability and part of the problem here –in addition to the complexity of human
behaviour- are the relatively low base-rates of criminal behaviour, which necessarily reduce
the likelihood of predictive ability. As Roberts and Horgan185 point out, it depends upon
context and the specific behaviours that are being predicted, but the generally very low rate of
violent terrorist activity (the „tip of the iceberg‟) means that this will be exceptionally
difficult to predict, perhaps even more so than criminal violence. This is not to say that
terrorist risk-assessment will be impossible or fruitless –indeed it should be expected to
produce significant advantages over unstructured „clinical‟ judgements- but it will be far from
infallible.
Need
As for Need, it seems equally important for D&D programs to focus upon factors
which directly relate to involvement in Islamist terrorism. Descriptions of these programs do
indicate that this is the case. Both cognitions (ideology, beliefs), and social circumstances
(peer associations, family) are addressed. In terms of the „Central Eight‟ and „Big Four‟
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(above) identified by Andrews et al186 as lying at the heart of risk/needs assessment, the
relevance of these in the context of working with terrorists requires testing. Nevertheless,
despite less obvious relevance of antisocial personality traits and substance abuse (which
might both still affect amenability to intervention when present) the remaining six
criminogenic factors (offence history, attitudes, social situation, family, school/work, and
leisure) are attended to in D&D programs. The next step will be to examine the empirical
relationships between these different variables and offending-related behaviours of interest,
which will help inform risk-assessment and targets of intervention.
Responsivity
The principle of Responsivity is also relevant. However, it is unclear to what extent existing
programs employ cognitive-behavioural techniques (as suggested in order to maximise
learning and adaptation), or to what extent individual „tailoring‟ is employed. As a general
rule, and with ideological argumentation in mind, it should be noted that verbal, logical
argument is unlikely to be a universally well-received format for learning. With regards to
cognitive-behavioural techniques, it is not necessarily the specific content used in offender
rehabilitation programs that is relevant, although this will vary. For example, self-control or
impulsivity are often targeted in criminal offender interventions, which may have limited
significance in terrorism. On the other hand, problem solving skills, critical reasoning and
social perspective taking are also popular,187 and these may have some applicability to
terrorists. It will, however, very likely prove useful to adhere to more general principles of
cognitive-behavioural treatment in practice with Islamist militants. This might include
rewards for appropriate behaviour, and cognitive rehearsal and behavioural practice in role
plays for dealing with certain situations. For example, in preparing individuals for release, it
might help to rehearse strategies for dealing with „bumping into‟ old associates or known
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radicals. Efforts to maximise potential for learning and persuasion will likely bolster existing
and future efforts at terrorist rehabilitation.
Organisation and Evaluation
Organisational principles of best practice may have direct applicability in many cases. The
contributions from criminologists on this topic provide a framework for thinking about how
to design and run a rehabilitative program for terrorists. These and other accounts (such as
how to go about assessing cost-effectiveness188) should be referred to and then adapted
according to the unique circumstances and treatment setting. In particular, the three key
points discussed above are especially relevant; namely the need for an empirically validated
theoretical framework, the need for a detailed program manual, and the need for built-in
evaluation as a means of monitoring program integrity and validity. Adopting these measures
–although by no means a straightforward affair- will help to professionalise rehabilitative
practice with Islamist terrorists and will be fundamental to assessing efficacy and improving
practice.
With these principles in mind it is of course important to recall that there is a vast
variation in current D&D programs, some of which are ad hoc and have little in the way of
discernible structure. Just as there is a deep and persisting gap between theory and practice in
offender rehabilitation, there is likely to be an even greater one in the field of terrorism.
Summary and Conclusion
The present article has offered an overview of current practice in rehabilitation of Islamist
terrorists, and has added to the pioneering work of numerous others by examining the
potential for the rehabilitation of ordinary offenders to inform parallel practice with terrorists.
Individual and collective processes of disengagement and deradicalisation are intimately
related to one another. Existing D&D programs for Islamist extremists are aimed at the
individual level of disengagement and deradicalisation, but should also show an awareness of
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how this might relate to the wider collective. Existing interventions focus on two main areas:
1. Re-education and rehabilitation, and 2. Providing a legitimate lifestyle (ideological and
social components, respectively). Psychological counselling is also a component in more
developed programs. Restorative justice practices and providing legitimate opportunities for
protest or action show promise but as yet appear to be underutilised. Organisationally,
programs show mixed governmental and non-governmental involvement, and often there is
multi-agency cooperation. Continuing issues in D&D practice include the (low) level of
militancy of participants, initial and ongoing risk assessment, and program transparency and
evaluation.
Rehabilitation programs for ordinary offenders are extremely diverse, with diverse
outcomes. However, a greater level of knowledge exists about what does and doesn‟t work,
and how principles of best practice should be implemented. The specific content of these
programs compared to working with terrorists will always differ, but there is sufficient
similarity between participant populations and program aims that lessons may be learned
from the criminal context. The principles of Risk, Need and Responsivity all show potential
application in the rehabilitation of Islamist terrorists, and to some extent are already being
implemented, or are in development. D&D programs may face many of the same
organisational challenges and may learn directly from principles of best practice in this
regard, although unique contexts will also present substantial challenges. It is equally
important to be aware of practices which may be detrimental to rehabilitative efforts, and
lessons learned from criminology are also relevant here.
In addition to providing a framework for understanding and increasing awareness of
the multitude of different issues involved in rehabilitative practice, criminology‟s value is
that it also illuminates many of the same conceptual and practical obstacles that will plague
parallel practice with Islamist terrorists. This in itself is sobering; however it is even more
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daunting to consider that many of these obstacles (e.g. difficulties in defining such
fundamental criteria as offences, recidivism or desistance; lack of data; coming up with
viable methodologies for research and evaluation; having to cope with organisational politics)
are amplified with terrorism. A comparative perspective is thus also important for
comprehending the scale of certain challenges and for shaping realistic expectations about
what might be achieved. In the long run this may be crucial to the continued survival of these
programs.
The rehabilitation of Islamist terrorists is a practice in its infancy. It faces many
unique challenges but can equally learn from related practices. It also presents unique
opportunities to understand more about extremism, and –given the special status of terrorists
and currently high level of resources being invested- may feed back into what we know about
rehabilitation more generally. As with crime, both „reform‟ and „relapse‟ are processes, not
single events, and failures will be inevitable. The enormity of the task should not deter
researchers from striving to advance the field; rather it is an indication of the necessity for a
concerted and thoughtful drive towards progress.
Finally, as a caveat, it should be emphasised that this has been a very general review.
Principles of best practice with offenders are based primarily upon white, male, adult
offenders in the Western world (thereby limiting transferability), and information on the
specific content of D&D programs is generally lacking. What is needed is a detailed, in-depth
consideration for how specific techniques might apply in culturally unique situations, along
with greater theoretical development in order to build a more comprehensive understanding
of individual disengagement and deradicalisation.
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